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Article

Resurrecting Trial by Statistics
Jay Tidmarsh

†

Always more popular among academics than among courts,
trial by statistics died on June 20, 2011. On that day, in an
opinion closely divided in other regards, the Supreme Court
1
unanimously “disapprove[d] that novel project.” The notion
that a court could try a representative sample of monetary
claims and extrapolate the average result to the remainder of
the cases was finished.
The demise of trial by statistics is a significant matter for
class actions and other aggregate litigation. Most obviously,
removing this method for determining damages limits the ability of a court to adjudicate a mass dispute should the cases
come to trial. Consider a class action with 200 members, each
cheated out of a different sum of money by a defendant’s wrong.
Unless a judge can employ some simple way to determine how
2
much each class member has lost, the judge must preside over
200 separate trials. Granted, the trials can be limited just to
damages; liability can be resolved on an aggregate basis. But
200 damages trials are still 200 trials. That number may not
seem too bad, and it probably isn’t. But what if there are 20,000
victims? Few judges would want to take on that herculean task,
and none could complete it. Trial by statistics allows the judge
† Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Ed Cheng, Alexandra Lahav, Teddy Rave, and David Rosenberg for their comments on drafts of
this Article. I also thank Tony Carucci and Clarence Wilson for research assistance. Copyright © 2015 by Jay Tidmarsh.
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). In WalMart the Court referred to trial by statistics as “Trial by Formula.” Id.
2. On occasion, a simple method exists. See Leyva v. Medline Indus.,
Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing a denial of class certification
when the defendant’s “computerized payroll and time-keeping database would
enable the court to accurately calculate damages and related penalties for
each claim”); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40–41 (1st Cir.
2003) (reversing a denial of class certification when a computer program could
calculate awards to cell-phone users allegedly overcharged for incoming calls).
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to hear just a fraction of the total number of cases, making the
resolution of mass disputes with varying amounts of individual
damages a realistic possibility.
The reason that the Supreme Court’s disapproval of trial
by statistics matters, however, is not the efficient conduct of
3
trial. Virtually every civil case settles, and class actions or oth4
er aggregate litigation are not exceptions to the rule. The real
battle—the one that determines the value of the settlement—is
5
whether the cases are aggregated in the first place. In a class
action seeking damages, class certification usually requires the
putative class representative to prove, among other things, that
common issues among class members predominate and that the
class action is superior to other methods for resolving the dis6
pute. The individuality of the damages awards may defeat a
3. In the most recent year for which statistics are available, 1.2% of civil
cases filed in federal court went to trial. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (2013). The rate was the same during
the prior year, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
tbl.C-4 (2012), and is a tick up from 2011 (1.1%), see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.C-4 (2011). These numbers are
generally consistent with the long-term decline in American trials. See, e.g.,
Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years of
War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2005) (discussing “a long-term and gradual
decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trial and a steep drop in the
absolute number of trials during the past twenty years”).
4. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 591, 606–07 (2006) (noting that, in an empirical study of state
and federal class actions, every class action that had been certified and had
terminated before the end of the study had settled); cf. VINCE MORABITO,
AUSTL. RESEARCH COUNCIL, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S CLASS
ACTION REGIMES: SECOND REPORT 5 (2010) (finding that approximately 41%
of class actions resolved under Australia’s new class-action rules had settled,
but that 100% of the resolved class actions that had been funded by third parties had settled).
5. See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled
Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1839, 1861 (2006) (“It is well understood that aggregation is the key to the viability of many claims routinely brought as class actions, particularly what are
termed the negative value claims, in which the transaction costs of prosecuting individual actions make enforcement impossible absent aggregation.”).
6. In federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 specifies the conditions under which a class action may go forward. In addition to meeting all
of the criteria found in Rules 23(a) and (g), a class must also meet one of the
four conditions specified in Rules 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Rule
23(b)(1)(A) is rarely used for damage claims. See In re Dennis Greenman Sec.
Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) can involve
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7

finding of predominance, and also puts a finding of superiority
into jeopardy—for the simple reason that a case requiring
20,000 damages hearings is unlikely to be seen as a superior
way to resolve a dispute. Increasingly, courts have required a
putative class representative to submit a “trial plan” detailing
8
how the case would be tried if it were certified. If the plaintiff
cannot provide a workable plan to try individual damages, a
9
court might deny class certification.
This is the point at which trial by statistics was often useful. Only three reported federal cases used trial by statistics to
10
determine damages, and two of them were reversed on appeal.
claims for damages against a limited fund, but the criteria apply to very few
monetary claims. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–41 (1999).
Rule 23(b)(2) categorically forbids virtually any claims for monetary relief. See
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61. But see id. at 2560 (suggesting one modest
potential exception to this bar). That leaves Rule 23(b)(3) as the likely source
of authority for a court contemplating the certification of a class action seeking
money. See id. at 2558 (noting that “individualized monetary claims belong in
Rule 23(b)(3)”). Rule 23(b)(3) has two criteria: that “the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
7. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013) (holding
that when the plaintiffs’ methodology failed to measure damages on a classwide basis, predominance was not satisfied because “[q]uestions of individual
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the
class”); Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To
be sure, individualized damage determinations cut against class certification
under Rule 23(b)(3).”). But see Smilow, 323 F.3d at 40 (“The individuation of
damages in consumer class actions is rarely determinative under Rule
23(b)(3).”).
8. See Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “courts’ increased use of class-action trial plans” is due to “the ‘critical
need . . . to determine how the case will be tried’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23
advisory committee’s note (2003))), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1722
(2013); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.756 (2004) [hereinafter MANUAL, FOURTH] (“A trial plan . . . will help determine whether a trial
will be manageable and meet all the Rule 23 certification standards.”); id.
§ 22.93 (“Judges often require the parties to submit detailed trial plans early
in the case and to modify the plans as the case develops.”).
9. See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 773, 777 (7th
Cir. 2013) (affirming the decertification of a class action when the plaintiffs
failed to offer a trial plan that could feasibly determine damages for 2341 class
members).
10. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F.
Supp. 2d 198, 247–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d in part on other grounds and
questions certified, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (Blue Cross I), questions answered, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 818
N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 2004) (Blue Cross II), rev’d, Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Estate of Ferdinand
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But in a number of other cases putative class counsel put a trial-by-statistics approach into the trial plan, and the court then
found that the class action was manageable enough to merit
11
certification. At least one of these cases trundled along toward
E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (D. Haw. 1995), aff’d
sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d in part,
151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). In Blue Cross I, the Second Circuit approved of
the use of a trial-by-statistics approach to determining damages but certified
the question to the New York Court of Appeals. Blue Cross I, 344 F.3d at 225–
29. The New York Court of Appeals did not address the question, finding that
the claim against the defendant failed on other grounds. Blue Cross II, 818
N.E.2d at 1146. As a result, the Second Circuit reversed the trial verdict on
grounds unrelated to the use of trial by statistics. Empire, 393 F.3d 312. The
Second Circuit ultimately took a negative view of trial by statistics in
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008).
The First Circuit also affirmed the use of an aggregate-damage approach
that had some elements of trial by statistics; the district court awarded damages based on the aggregate harm suffered by the class (calculable as the difference in price between the actual and the fair market prices for certain
drugs) rather than the amount of injury to each class member. See In re
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 162, 195–98 (1st
Cir. 2009); cf. In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997)
(approving the concept of sampling, but finding that the chosen plan was defective due to the failure to use a random sample).
The reception of state courts to trial by statistics has been similarly lukewarm. See, e.g., Leverence v. PFS Corp., 532 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Wis. 1995)
(“[T]he aggregative procedure cannot be used, as it was here, in place of a
party’s right to a trial . . . .”); Scottsdale Mem’l Health Sys., Inc. v. Maricopa
Cnty., 228 P.3d 117, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting the use of statistical
evidence to prove damages in some circumstances but holding that the trial
court had failed to find that these circumstances existed).
11. The trial plans often called for dividing the cases into stages, with liability determined in a first stage and damages in a later stage. See In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 188–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2010); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 178 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (approving a trial plan involving a first-stage liability phase and a second-stage formula process for determining backpay awards, even though the
plaintiffs’ briefs addressed the formula process only in the “most conclusory
terms”), aff’d, 603 F.3d 571, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting that “a range
of possibilities,” including trial by statistics, could make the case manageable),
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 100
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 139–40 (declining to rule on the propriety of using trial by statistics); see also Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1017–20
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming class certification when trial plan included a Phase
III trial of claims in small groups and using the results from these groups to
“facilitate settlements”). But see Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F. Supp. 2d 153,
169–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a trial-by-statistics plan); Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 493–94 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting a plan with bifurcation and trial-by-statistics elements).
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a settlement that obviated the need for actually using trial by
12
statistics. In other words, the prospect of trial by statistics facilitated aggregation. Wal-Mart’s rejection of trial by statistics
makes mass aggregation that much more difficult to achieve
13
due to the lack of good alternatives for trying mass damages.
I come neither to praise trial by statistics nor to bury it.
Part I of this Article shows that strong arguments favor trial by
statistics, but equally compelling arguments lie on the other
The wavering enthusiasm for a trial-by-statistics approach can also be
seen in the Manual for Complex Litigation. In 1995, the third edition of the
Manual endorsed, as one trial option, a trial-by-statistics plan not unlike the
Marcos plan. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.28 (1995). By
the next edition in 2004, the Manual had backed off this position, noting only
that a trial-by-statistics plan was possible “[a]lthough not accepted as mainstream.” MANUAL, FOURTH, supra note 8, § 21.5.
12. After the decision in Watson, 979 F.2d 1014, the parties reportedly
settled while a petition for rehearing was pending. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 53
F.3d 663, 664 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal); MANUAL, FOURTH, supra
note 8, § 22.756 n.1401 (noting that the case settled).
13. Principal among the other tools for trying aggregated cases are bellwether trials, in which the court tries a small number of cases to generate
enough information about claim value for the parties to forge a settlement,
and cy pres relief, in which recoveries that cannot be feasibly provided to victims are instead given to a non-profit group whose interests roughly align with
the victims’ interests. On bellwether trials, see generally Eldon E. Fallon et
al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008)
[hereinafter Lahav, Bellwether Trials]. On cy pres, see, for example, In re Baby
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When excess settlement funds remain after claimants have received the distribution they are entitled to under the terms of the settlement agreement, there are three principal options for distributing the remaining funds—reversion to the defendant,
escheat to the state, or distribution of the funds cy pres.”); AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(b) (2010) (recommending the use of cy pres when individual damages distributions are not
“economically viable” or are otherwise “impossible or unfair”). One problem
with bellwether trials, which are most useful in positive-value cases, is that a
court cannot use the method to resolve large numbers of cases; it must hope
that a settlement—in which recoveries are negotiated rather than adjudicated—can be substituted for trial of all the claims. Cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, The
Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 610–12 (2012) [hereinafter
Lahav, Trial by Formula] (describing cases in which bellwether plaintiffs were
used to forge an aggregate settlement). One problem with cy pres, which is
most useful in negative-value cases, is that it may result in no recovery for victims—an even worse result for victims than the admittedly imperfect average
award of trial by statistics.
For other approaches for trying a mass number of claims, none of which is
a realistic panacea in most cases seeking individualized damages, see In re
Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2001),
overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d
24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006); MANUAL, FOURTH, supra note 8, § 22.93.
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side. Whatever its abstract merits, trial by statistics was ultimately doomed to die because it suffered from a fatal disease: it
failed to allow the parties to submit individualized proof not only on the amount of injury but also—and this was the especially
damning part—on the fact of injury. Courts were unwilling to
trade their long-standing insistence on proof of individual causation for the new-fangled proof of aggregated and averaged injury, regardless of how much simpler it was to adjudicate the
latter issue.
That fact does not mean that trial by statistics in all forms
should be abandoned. Part II suggests a modified trial-bystatistics approach that reaps many of the benefits of trial by
statistics, minimizes its costs, and satisfies Wal-Mart’s critique.
The solution is to make the average award—as determined in a
trial-by-statistics process—the presumptive award for each
class member. The court must enter judgment for this amount
in each case unless a party rebuts the presumption with individualized proof of damages.
Unlike trial by statistics, a presumptive-judgment approach gives the parties the power to contest both the fact and
the quantum of injury. As Part II explains, however, a party
has no incentive to do so unless the party can expect a better
outcome after factoring in the costs of individual litigation. In
many cases, no party will contest the presumptive judgment. In
some situations, however, at least one party expects a better
outcome from an individual trial, and therefore has an incentive to reject the presumptive award. Part II explores ways to
limit this incentive and thus to reduce significantly the likelihood of individual trials. Although using presumptive judgments is not a panacea for all aggregated proceedings involving
individualized damages, this modified trial-by-statistics approach provides a new and useful technique to resolve a large
swath of complex cases.
I. THE PROS AND CONS OF TRIAL BY STATISTICS
The idea behind trial by statistics is to extrapolate the results from a sample of cases to a broader group of claims. The
sample, which is randomly selected from within the group,
must be of a sufficient size for the court to assume (to a specified level of confidence) that the sample accurately reflects the
14
broader population. The results achieved in the sample trials
14. For a description of the process, see Michael J. Saks & Peter David
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(including defense verdicts) are then averaged, and the average
15
award is given to the unsampled members of the group.
For example, assume a group of a hundred claims. From
this group, a court would randomly select a sample of sufficient
size that the court would have a strong assurance that the
sample possesses the same characteristics as the larger group
of claims. Let’s say that this sample size is ten. The jury tries
these ten claims to conclusion. Assume that the jury returns a
defense verdict in one case, but also finds that five victims were
injured in the amount of $10,000 and four in the amount of
$25,000. Thus, the total amount awarded is $150,000. The average of the ten claims is $15,000, which is the amount that
16
each of the ninety unsampled claimants would receive.
There are numerous benefits to this approach, but also
some significant drawbacks.
A. THE BENEFITS
Trial by statistics possesses a number of positive features.
The first is better deterrence. If the sampling is done well, the
court obtains a good sense of the size of the harm that the defendant has caused, and can extrapolate from the sample to ensure that the defendant is held responsible for that amount of
harm—no more and no less. Thus, defendants will internalize
the costs of their behavior, and will be neither underdeterred
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 841–51 (1992).
15. Although the average award could be given to the individuals who
compose the sample, the courts that have used trial by statistics have awarded
the damages determined by the jury to claimants in the sample. See Hilao, 103
F.3d at 783–84 & n.9; Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. This approach may limit
the sample’s incentive to invest optimally in damages issues, thus reducing
the accuracy of the sample. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication:
Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV.
561, 587–93 (1993).
16. I choose these numbers for the sake of simplicity. If sampling actually
yielded the results described in the text, the methodology might be suspect:
the court should probably have sampled the low-value ($10,000) claims and
high-value ($25,000) claims separately. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at
844–47. In the example, I also compute the average as the arithmetic mean of
the individual judgments. I discuss other ways to determine the average infra
notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
Although I describe the trial-by-statistics process in terms of jury verdicts,
I assume that the verdicts are subject to appeal and that the post-appeal values of those verdicts are used in calculating the average award. Thus, if the
court of appeals reversed one of the nine plaintiff verdicts, the average would
be computed with this case treated as a defense verdict.
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17

nor overdeterred. The proper internalization of costs is especially important when the lack of trial by statistics would lead
a court to deny the aggregation of claims due to the lack of an
18
effective means for providing redress. Wrongdoers in such situations often would go undeterred.
Second, the process is less costly than one-by-one trials. In
the hypothetical above, the court can dispense with ninety tri19
als, with all their attendant costs. From these gains must be
deducted the trial costs of any of the sampled cases that—due
to their weakness or small value—would never have been tried
17. On the importance of actors internalizing the costs of their actions, see
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 144, 174–78 (1970). See also
Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323,
346 n.97 (2012) (“If one is truly committed to welfare maximization, one must
ensure that potential injurers internalize the costs of negligent conduct.”). For
applications of this principle to trial by statistics, see Bone, supra note 15, at
595–98 (positing the argument before critiquing it from rights-based and process-based perspectives); Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 829–30 (analyzing
the deterrence argument in terms of due process).
Professor Kaplow makes a different deterrence argument. Investigating
the circumstances in which an accurate determination of damages is socially
beneficial, he demonstrates that awarding the average amount of damages
makes sense when defendants, “at the time they decide how to act, know only
the average level of harm for the type of act they will commit but not the actual harm their act will cause.” Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 313 (1994). In this
situation, insisting on “greater precision ex post, in adjudication, is a waste of
resources because information learned later cannot improve the earlier decision”; incurring the expense of proving individual damages is socially harmful
because it has no deterrent effect and it costs more than providing an average
award. Id. at 313–14. When a defendant can know ex ante the actual harm it
will cause, then greater accuracy in damages is beneficial if the actual level of
damages influences a defendant’s decision whether to take care and if the cost
of determining damages is less than the gains achieved by the change in behavior. Id. at 314–15; see id. at 315 (“[A]ccuracy will be valuable when it is
cheap and the effect on use of the substance would involve substantial benefits.”). For cases in which actual damages should be calculated, Professor Kaplow does not address which method of determining actual harm—the question
at the heart of the trial-by-statistics debate—is best.
18. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text.
19. In the Cimino litigation, Judge Parker tried 169 sample cases, 160 of
which required a determination of damages, before extrapolating the results to
another 2220 cases. Trying the 160 damages cases took 133 days of trial time,
with four judges, three magistrate judges, and two juries engaged in the process. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (“If all that is accomplished by this [trial
process] is the closing of 169 cases, then it was not worth the effort and will
not be repeated.”). A method even less expensive than trial by statistics would
be to survey the sample rather than to conduct trials and to put the results of
the surveys before the factfinder. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 554–56 (1998) (proposing such surveys). No court has taken this additional step.
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individually. With the small-value cases, however, the first argument loops back in: without a cost-effective method for deciding these cases, defendants could cause small-value harms on a
20
large scale with impunity.
Third, under certain conditions trial by statistics can enhance accuracy—a positive feature both for those who believe
21
that legal process should be as efficient as possible and for
those who believe that procedure’s role is to enforce substantive
22
rights as perfectly as possible. Most evidently, trial by statistics can smooth out aberrational jury awards in individual cas23
es. Of course, enhanced accuracy is not a guarantee; it depends on a number of factors, including a homogenous and
24
randomly selected sample of proper size, equal incentives for
20. The argument in the text is essentially economic. It is possible to develop a process-based argument along the same lines. Although the day-incourt ideal generally disfavors the use of trial by statistics, see infra notes 40–
41 and accompanying text, the scarcity of judicial resources and the costliness
of individual litigation can legitimate trial by statistics as a matter of procedural fairness, see Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 227, 256–59 (2011) (refining the process-based argument originally made in Bone, supra note 15, at 628–50).
21. From an economic viewpoint, the law should minimize the sum of
harm, preventing harm, and transaction costs such as the cost of litigation.
See CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 26–31. Although this objective does not necessarily require that litigation costs be kept to their minimum, doing so is
usually regarded as an important goal. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (7th ed. 2007). Litigation costs are composed of two
elements: the direct costs of litigation (attorney’s fees, expenses, and the like)
and the costs of errors. Id. As a rule, there is a trade-off between accuracy and
litigation expenditures; with trial by statistics, however, the arguably more
accurate process, see infra note 23 and accompanying text, is also cheaper, see
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 934
(1999).
23. See Edward K. Cheng, When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective on Trial Sampling, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 957 (2012)
(“Given the right conditions, sampling can actually produce more accurate
outcomes than individualized adjudication.”); Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at
835 (“By awarding that same amount to each of the remaining . . . plaintiffs,
the court also does better, in terms of accuracy of award, than it would if it
conducted . . . individualized trials.”).
24. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 844–47; cf. Cheng, supra note 23,
at 963–65 (arguing that in some situations non-random sampling of extreme
cases can provide an accurate estimate of total damages). One of the challenges in a trial-by-statistics plan is defining the group from which the sample
is drawn. In Hilao and Cimino, the groups were known; they were composed of
plaintiffs who had submitted claims or filed suit. See In re Estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 & n.1 (D. Haw.
1995), aff’d sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996);
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the plaintiffs and the defendants to invest in the sample tri25
26
als, and a lack of bias by the factfinder. At the same time, it
is important to understand the nature of the accuracy argument. “Accuracy” does not mean that each and every claimant
receives exactly the right amount; indeed, the likelihood is high
that, when claimants’ injuries are variable, the average recovery will provide some claimants with too much recovery and
27
others with too little. Even if it does not increase the accuracy
28
of individual awards, however, trial by statistics may do a better job of determining the aggregate liability of the defendant—
a fact that again loops back to the first argument on deterrence.
Fourth, in some cases trial by statistics ensures a modicum
of compensation to victims when no other method would be as
adequate and timely. For instance, in the absence of a plan to
Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652. In some class actions, the exact membership of
the class may not be known, thus making the process of selecting a random
sample more difficult. The difficulty is somewhat lessened by the doctrine
that, when class membership is truly impossible to ascertain, a class action
should not be certified. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593
(3d Cir. 2012) (“If class members are impossible to identify without extensive
and individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate.”).
25. See Bone, supra note 15, at 588–93; cf. David Rosenberg, MandatoryLitigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 831, 847–53 (2002) (arguing that a mandatory class action is necessary
in order to equalize investment incentives between mass-tort plaintiffs and
defendants).
26. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 847–50.
27. See Bone, supra note 15, at 579–84 (demonstrating that in many trialby-statistics plans, a large number of the claimants who receive the average
award will not receive an award that precisely compensates them for their
losses).
28. Indeed, for reasons unrelated to trial by statistics, the process of aggregation itself can change the value of claims. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of
Plaintiffs on Jurors’ Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914, 916 (2000) (reporting
experimental data showing that the likelihood of recovery increases as more
plaintiffs are aggregated but that the average damages award decreases if
more than four plaintiffs are aggregated); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S.
Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
209, 225–26 (1988) (reporting experimental data showing that the aggregation
of claims increases the likelihood of recovery on weak claims but suppresses
the value of strong claims, and that experimental juries were told of the presence of other similar victims). Aggregation may also create a litigation “premium,” partly because a defendant can settle all claims and buy global peace and
partly because a risk-averse defendant will not want to try a massive case
with potentially ruinous financial consequences. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667
F.3d 273, 339 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring).
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distribute damages, a court may decline to aggregate the
29
claims, leaving victims with no remedy. Or a court may opt for
another remedial alternative, like cy pres relief, that extracts a
payment from the defendant but still leaves the victims with no
30
remedy. Even aggregate settlements usually result in imperfect compensation, because the structures used to award compensation often resemble administrative schemes in which an
award hinges more on a few generic factors than on a victim’s
31
unique situation. In a world of imperfect solutions, sometimes
half a loaf is better than none—regardless of whether a victim’s
32
“true” entitlement is a quarter of a loaf or three-quarters.
The first four arguments are essentially instrumental in
nature: they justify trial by statistics in terms of an improved
quality of outcome. But trial by statistics also advances certain
non-instrumental process values. Principal among these is
equality: the process has the potential to achieve the like
treatment of like cases, which is always one of the most elusive
33
goals in a civil-justice system. But it can also enhance other
values such as participation, predictability, transparency, and
34
rationality.
Finally, in limited instances trial by statistics can advance
plaintiff autonomy. For instance, in Cimino all the plaintiffs in
the larger group consented to statistical averaging if their
35
claims were not selected as samples. Thus, Cimino was able to
sidestep one of the classic arguments against trial by statistics—that individual victims receive too much or too little.
When all the plaintiffs consent to the process, they get exactly
what they expect: a quick, efficient result, for which they are
29. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 13.
31. See Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments
on Claims Resolution Facilities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at
113 (comparing and analyzing different claims-resolution schemes); cf. In re
Combustion, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 673, 673–74 (W.D. La. 1997) (awarding compensation based on a special master’s report in which awards were based on
the number of points a claim had earned for factors such as distance from a
toxic waste site and medical history).
32. Admittedly trial by statistics also requires a defendant to compensate
some claimants who were entitled to no loaf at all; the invalid claims in the
unsampled group receive the same average recovery as the valid claims.
33. For an extended examination of the equality argument, see Lahav,
Trial by Formula, supra note 13, at 593–620.
34. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 831–32.
35. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex.
1990), rev’d, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
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willing to trade an individually accurate award. Of course, this
argument has limits. The quality of the information on which
36
consent is based must be good; it may not be possible to obtain
each victim’s consent in some cases; and a defendant’s refusal
to consent is a cross-cutting factor.
B. THE DRAWBACKS
Many of the drawbacks of trial by statistics are mirror images of the benefits, in the sense that they attack the premises
underlying the supposed benefits of the process. But some of
the drawbacks suggest new difficulties.
The first drawback is that, for the individual victims who
receive the average award, the process almost always results in
either over-compensation or under-compensation. That result is
starkest for those claimants who would have been determined,
after trial, to deserve no award at all. But other claimants are
also likely to receive an award that they do not merit, even if
the defendant ends up paying the right amount of damage in
37
the aggregate. Not only does this disparity raise an issue of
accuracy at the microcosmic level of the individual claim, but it
also raises a macrocosmic question of justice. If a legal system
must correct wrongs to individuals, as adherents to theories of
corrective justice hold, then correctly determining a defendant’s
liability en masse is insufficient. Rather, the linkage between a
plaintiff’s harm and a defendant’s causal contribution to that
harm is the only justification for redistribution from a defend38
ant to a plaintiff. Except for the sampled cases, trial by statis-

36. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 825 & nn.77–79 (discussing the
quality of the plaintiffs’ consent in Cimino and recognizing the need for additional analysis of the Cimino approach when some plaintiffs refuse to consent).
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. For the argument that corrective justice demands a causal link between a defendant’s wrong and a plaintiff’s injury, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 407–16 (1987); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949, 979–81 (1988). Modern civil-recourse theory reflects the same intuition.
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A
Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J.
569, 571 (2013) (“Absent an injury to someone, there is no tort, and even
where there is an injury connected to wrongful conduct, there is still no tort
unless the conduct was not merely wrongful in a generic sense, but wrongful
as to the injury victim.”). See also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1641–49 (2002) (arguing that redress is required only when the defendant’s conduct harms the plaintiff, not
when it creates a risk of harm).
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tics eliminates the proof on both sides of this connection: the
defendant’s causal act and the plaintiff’s consequent injury.
Second, trial by statistics has practical problems that make
its capacity to determine damages accurately suspect. I have
already listed the principal difficulties: defining homogenous
groups or subgroups to sample, selecting a proper sample size,
ensuring adequate investment incentives for the plaintiffs who
participate in the exemplary trials, and choosing unbiased
39
factfinders. If the process fails to yield a good estimate of the
defendant’s liability, the argument for trial by statistics collapses.
Third, for all of the unsampled cases, trial by statistics denies the plaintiffs and the defendant their right to a “day in
court”—an autonomy-enhancing ideal that that is sometimes
40
seen as the hallmark of American justice. Even if the
41
unsampled plaintiffs consent to the process, thus mitigating
the autonomy concern for them, the same is not true for the defendant, whose ability to contest its liability to each plaintiff is
sacrificed.
Relatedly, the nature of adjudication arguably demands
42
individualized assessment of the facts of each case. This argument hinges on a contestable notion about the meaning of
adjudication, and further assumes that courts cannot legitimately perform tasks other than this form of particularized
dispute resolution. But at least on some views of the limits of
43
the “judicial Power” in Article III, there is a constitutional
hook for arguing that federal courts do not have the power to
44
order a trial by statistics.
39. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (noting that a
court’s inability to bind nonparties to a prior judgment “is part of our ‘deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court’”
(quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4449 (1981))), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
41. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
42. For a development of this argument, which Professor Bone calls the
“methodological legitimacy objection,” see Bone, supra note 20, at 259–65.
43. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
44. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing, in the context of the federal courts’ equitable powers in complex
institutional-reform litigation, that the judicial power should be construed in
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This same concern transmutes into a constitutional concern with a different textual anchor: that “[a] defendant in a
class action has a due process right to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims, and a class action cannot be certified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks individual
45
issues.” This argument pits contrasting visions of the Due
Process Clause against each other. On the one side is the view
46
that the Clause requires cost-effective process, thus justifying
a trial-by-statistics approach as long as the defendant’s total
47
liability is assessed with sufficient accuracy. On the other is
the view that the Clause protects a right of individual participation in litigation (except in narrow circumstances, of which
48
trial by statistics is not one). On this latter view trial by statistics is constitutionally infirm.
Another constitutional infirmity is the arguable violation of
49
the right to jury trial in civil cases. The argument is a variant
accordance with “history and tradition” and “the Framers’ design”).
45. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
46. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting that due
process “generally requires consideration of three distinct factors”: “the private
interest that will be affected”; “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and “the Government’s interest,
including . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”); POSNER, supra note 21, § 21.1
(arguing that the Mathews balancing test instantiates the Hand Formula approach to determining the process that is due).
47. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 785-87 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding a trial-by-statistics plan by relying on the Mathews balancing test);
Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 827–30 (arguing that trial by statistics meets
the requirement of Mathews).
48. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307; McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522
F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (“When fluid recovery is used to permit the mass
aggregation of claims, the right of defendants to challenge the allegations of
individual plaintiffs is lost, resulting in a due process violation.”), abrogated on
other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 656–58
(2008); cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008) (listing six exceptions to the due-process requirement that only parties can be bound by a
judgment); Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (holding
that, in order to bind a person to a judgment, due process generally requires
that the person be made a party to the case).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, . . . the right to
trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). Because the Seventh Amendment has
never been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, state courts
need not afford litigants the same scope of jury-trial rights. See Robert Wilson,
Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Pickering Test, 18
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 389, 401 & n.116 (2008). Nonetheless, all but two
states (Louisiana and Wyoming) have comparable if not stronger jury-trial
rights. Id.
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of the same idea: defendants have a right to have a jury decide
whether it has harmed each plaintiff and, if so, the amount of
the damage. Applying an average award to unsampled cases
violates this right. Like the Due Process Clause, however, the
Seventh Amendment can be read in different ways. On the
view that the right to jury trial must adapt to modern conditions, there is no constitutional difficulty with trial by statistics; nor does a defendant have a right to insist on a jury’s precise allocation of damages among victims as long as the jury
50
gets the aggregate damages correct. On the contrary view, the
right to an individualized verdict concerning each victim is an
essential component of the right to jury trial, and trial by sta51
tistics cannot stand.
The idea that defendants have a right to individualized determinations of liability and damages plays into yet another
doctrinal channel. In cases not premised on federal law, federal
courts are constitutionally required to apply the relevant
52
state’s substantive law. If that state’s law requires individualized assessments of causation and damage, then federal courts
53
may not use trial by statistics to sidestep the requirement.
50. Cf. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, supra note 13, at 589–96 (arguing that
bellwether trials do not violate the right to jury trial). See generally Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1920) (“New devices may be used to adapt the
ancient institution [of jury trial] to present needs and to make of it an efficient
instrument in the administration of justice. Indeed, such changes are essential
to the preservation of the right.”). For cases finding no Seventh Amendment
barrier to the use of statistical methods for determining aggregate liability,
see Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1248–50
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215;
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d
198, 255–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d on other grounds and questions certified,
344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (Blue Cross I), questions answered, 818 N.E.2d
1140 (N.Y. 2004) (Blue Cross II), rev’d, Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1468–69 (D. Haw. 1995), aff’d
on other grounds sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
1996).
51. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319–21 (5th Cir.
1998).
52. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
53. The first case to accept the Erie argument was In re Fibreboard Corp.,
893 F.2d 706, 711–12 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Cimino, 151 F.3d at 321
(“[F]ederal courts must remain faithful to Erie and must maintain ‘the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches.’ . . . ‘The Judicial
Branch can offer the trial of lawsuits. It has no power or competence to do
more.’” (quoting Fibreboard, 893 F.2d at 711–12)). For an argument that state
law did not prevent aggregate sampling and that Erie was therefore not offended, see Blue Cross, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 259–62. On appeal, the Second Cir-
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A final permutation of the theme is that any changes to the
requirement of individualized proof of liability and damages—
for both state-law and federal-law claims—is a legislative decision, and therefore beyond the purview of a court. Insofar as a
federal court is contemplating the use of trial by statistics, the
Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act) therefore stands as a barrier. The Enabling Act allows the Supreme Court to promulgate
54
“general rules of practice and procedure,” but only when those
rules do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
55
right.” In Wal-Mart the Supreme Court observed that using
trial by statistics to make class actions workable would render
56
Rule 23 (as applied) suspect under the Enabling Act. Because
the point was not essential to its holding, the Court did not explain its reasoning in detail, noting only that a defendant is
“entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual
57
claims.” By extension, a defendant has a right to contest the
fact of its liability to each claimant, including the fact of the
58
claimant’s injury. But the Court said nothing about whether
trial by statistics was a permissible means to adjudicate the
amount of injury. Put differently, the Enabling Act prevents a
federal court from certifying a class action in which the trial
plan precludes a defendant from contesting the wrongfulness of
its conduct toward each claimant and the causal connection between its conduct and each claimant’s alleged injury. Whether
cuit certified the issue of New York’s amenability to aggregate statistical proof
to the New York Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals’ decision on another issue made it unnecessary to reach the point. See supra note 10.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
55. Id. § 2072(b).
56. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). For a
contrary argument ultimately superseded by Wal-Mart, see Schwab v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1271–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
2008).
57. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
58. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure
of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 156–57 (2003) (“[T]he basis for
the implied delegation of bargaining power to class counsel must arise from
matters that preexist the class action itself and, accordingly, that a class settlement—unlike public legislation—enjoys no general mandate to alter unilaterally the rights of class members.”). Although Professor Nagareda’s argument
specifically addressed the need to settle cases on the basis of preexisting legal
rights, his argument applies equally to novel methods of adjudication that alter the entitlement of class members to recovery. In a different section of WalMart, the Court referenced elements of Professor Nagareda’s theory. WalMart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556; see also id. at 2562, 2566 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (accepting aspects of Professor Nagareda’s theory).
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it prevents a court from providing an average award to claimants when the defendant remains free to contest liability and
causation is an open question.
This reading of Wal-Mart gets some support from the
59
Court’s recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. In
60
Behrend the plaintiffs alleged four antitrust violations. At the
class certification hearing, the plaintiffs’ expert presented a
damages model to calculate the harm to the class as a result of
61
these violations. The district court certified a class for only
62
one of the four violations.
The Supreme Court overturned the certification order because the expert’s model had been premised on the existence of
four antitrust violations; it had not segregated the amount of
damages arising from the single violation on which the class
could proceed. That was a fatal error, for “a model purporting
to serve as evidence of damages in this class action must measure only those damages attributable to [the one viable] theo63
ry.” On the other hand, the Court did not expect similar precision with regard to a model’s determination of the quantum of
injury: “Calculations need not be exact,” as long as they are
64
“‘consistent with [the] liability case.’”
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
Id. at 1430–31.
Id. at 1431.
Id.
Id. at 1433.
Id. (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST
DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010)); see also Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977) (stating that,
when a court attempts to fashion relief for class members who were victims of
past racial discrimination, the “process of recreating the past will necessarily
involve a degree of approximation and imprecision” and require the court to
“balance the equities of each [class member’s] situation”). The same intuition
can be found in lower-court decisions that refuse to condition class certification
on an accurate calculation of individual damages but demand proof of the link
between the defendant’s conduct and class members’ damages. See, e.g., In re
Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[The defendant’s] liability as to each class member was proven through common evidence;
extrapolation was used only to approximate damages. Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on the use of extrapolation to calculate damages.”); In
re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming
class certification when “the fact of damages was a question common to the
class even if the amount of damages sustained by each individual class member varied,” and further noting that the court’s prior decisions had “never required a precise mathematical calculation of damages before deeming a class
worthy of certification” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McLaughlin v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]ggregate determination
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Trial by statistics, of course, dispenses with proof of a
causal connection for all the aggregated claims except for the
sampled victims: the non-liability of the defendant to some
unsampled class members is accounted for by reducing the av65
erage award. While this approach may get the aggregate liability of the defendant right, it fails to allow the defendant to
prove that its conduct caused no harm to a given plaintiff. The
lesson of Wal-Mart and Comcast is that a class action cannot
66
take a shortcut to avoid turning this very square corner.
C. SUMMARY
It is worth remembering that Wal-Mart’s opposition to trial
by statistics could be overcome by legislation, and state courts
are not required to follow the Supreme Court’s understanding
67
of Rule 23. Although Wal-Mart has effectively sealed its fate
in federal court for the time being, trial by statistics remains
68
alive in theory. Perhaps that is to be expected, given that the
is likely to result in an astronomical damages figure that does not accurately
reflect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by defendants and that bears
little or no relationship to the amount of economic harm actually caused by
defendants.”), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem.
Co., 553 U.S. 639, 656–58 (2008); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]ctual injury cannot be
presumed, and defendants have the right to raise individual defenses against
each class member.”); In re Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974)
(“[A]llowing gross damages by treating unsubstantiated claims of class members collectively significantly alters substantive rights . . . .”).
65. In the example at the start of this Section, I calculated the $15,000
average award by including the one defense verdict out of the ten total verdicts, and dividing the total award ($150,000 for the nine plaintiff verdicts
plus $0 for the one defense verdict) by the total number of verdicts (ten). The
same outcome would result if I had added up and averaged only the nine
plaintiff verdicts ($150,000 ÷ 9, or $16,666.67), and then reduced that average
by the 90% success rate for plaintiffs ($16,666.67 × .9, or $15,000).
66. For a case analyzing this connection between Wal-Mart and Comcast,
see Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Comcast
brings damages to the forefront of the class certification inquiry—a holding
that, when combined with [Wal-Mart’s] discussion of trial by formula, suggests
that where individualized damages questions so predominate over damages
questions capable of classwide proof, certification is inappropriate and raises
due process concerns for defendants.”).
67. Any federal legislation or state adoption of trial by statistics would
need to answer the constitutional objections discussed supra notes 42–53 and
accompanying text.
68. Some post-Wal-Mart courts have expressed their belief that trial by
statistics is available in some cases. See, e.g., Urethane Antitrust, 768 F.3d at
1257, 1269 (noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on the
use of extrapolation to calculate damages,” and further stating that the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit a pro rata reduction in class damages
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arguments on both sides are strong and trial by statistics can
do some very useful work. Thus far, however, the cases and
commentators have not provided a roadmap that explains as a
practical matter how judges can navigate around Wal-Mart’s
imposing roadblock.
Although the issue is close, trial by statistics in its present
form deserves its fate. Despite the caselaw and academic literature that have argued for compensation based on risk as a
69
means to achieve optimal deterrence, denying defendants the
ability to submit evidence tending to disprove that their conduct caused harm to a specific claimant remains a bridge too
far under present American law.
But that fact does not the end the matter. When arguments lie in close equipoise, there often exists a mediating solution that captures many of an idea’s benefits while sidestepping
when a jury awarded less than the expert’s statistical model suggested because a defendant “has no interest in the method of distributing the aggregate
damages award among the class members”); Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc.,
294 F.R.D. 550, 572 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that the use of a survey to establish damages did not violate Wal-Mart or the defendant’s due-process rights);
Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG (SPx), 2013 WL 146323, at
*4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (noting that Wal-Mart was inapplicable when
the calculation of wage-and-hour penalties did not require individualized determinations); see also Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-03339EJD, 2012 WL 5818300, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (collecting cases refusing to permit a trial-by-statistics approach after Wal-Mart); United States v.
City of New York, 276 F.R.D. 22, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he court must look to
the underlying substantive law to determine whether the proposed method of
classwide proof prevents the party opposing class certification from asserting
its substantive rights.”). Commentators also continue to make normative arguments favoring the process. See Bone, supra note 20, at 230 (analyzing the
argument from various normative perspectives and concluding that, even after
Wal-Mart, “there is still room left for sampling in future cases”); Cheng, supra
note 23 (grounding the argument in accuracy); Lahav, Trial by Formula, supra
note 13 (grounding the argument in equality).
69. For some of the leading academic commentary, see Joseph H. King,
Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Glen
O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 781–83 (1985); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection
in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 849, 855 (1984). The best-known judicial instance of substituting liability
based on risk for liability based on causation is market-share liability. See
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936–38 (Cal. 1980) (making manufacturers responsible for their share of the product market when the products are
identical and the plaintiffs, through no fault of their own, cannot prove which
manufacturer’s product caused harm). But see Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066–68 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the market-share
theory did not apply to manufacturers of handguns).
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many of its weaknesses. The following section describes a practical and defensible middle ground for trial by statistics.
II. PRESUMPTIVE JUDGMENTS
If the central and ultimately fatal flaw of trial by statistics
is its failure to permit unsampled plaintiffs or defendants to
contest the average award in a particular case, then the only
way to realize the benefits of the process is to nudge the parties
voluntarily to accept the average award. The simplest way to
do so is to establish a presumption that the average award (determined according to appropriate sampling practices) applies
to every unsampled case. Any plaintiff can overcome the presumption by submitting evidence that her individual award exceeds the presumptive judgment. The defendant can overcome
the presumption by submitting evidence that the plaintiff in
question deserves less than the presumptive judgment—either
by raising individual issues that would eliminate liability altogether (such as causation or an applicable defense) or by showing that the plaintiff’s damages are less than the presumption.
When a party challenges the award, the other party may introduce evidence to the contrary. As soon as either party challeng70
es the award, the presumption collapses. The court must use
ordinary adjudicatory methods to determine the liability of the
defendant to that individual plaintiff and the damages (if any).
To be clear, the proposal breaks no new ground for the use
of trial by statistics. The presumptive judgment is not an option
for every aggregated case. It should not be available when an71
other method for calculating damages is more cost-effective.
70. The “bursting bubble” theory of presumptions is originally associated
with Professors Thayer and Wigmore. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5121,
5122.1, 5126 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the “bursting bubble”); cf. FED. R. EVID.
301 (requiring a party against whom a presumption is directed in a civil case
to produce evidence to rebut the presumption but keeping the burden of persuasion on whichever party originally bore it).
71. In some cases, such a simple method exists. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also George v. Nat’l Water Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D.
168, 181–82 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that trial-by-statistics concerns were not
implicated when the defendant had a uniform wage policy and individual
damages could be calculated by “reconstructing the correct wage algorithm”).
Of course, the argument for trial by statistics is often made at the start of
the case, in conjunction with a class-certification motion and before the defendant has sunk any costs into the case. See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text. If the presumptive-average approach is used to convince a court to
certify a class action in which the social benefits of the class action are lower
than its costs, then the approach does more harm than good. I proceed on the
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Likewise, the alleged victims may be insufficiently homogenous
72
or insufficiently identifiable to justify sampling. Even when
an aggregated case is a good candidate for sampling, the process must be carried out with scientific rigor, and the results
must be of sufficient quality to justify the court’s extrapolation
73
of the average award to the unsampled cases. Only when
sampling can reliably determine the aggregate amount of the
defendant’s liability to the plaintiffs may trial by statistics be
used.
The effect of this proposal is to put trial by statistics, as
modified, back into a judge’s case-management toolbox. This
Part considers the mechanics of presumptive judgments and
the steps needed to avoid gamesmanship by the parties in their
use of the process. It then evaluates the resulting system in
light of the arguments for and against trial by statistics that
Part I described.
A. HOW PRESUMPTIVE JUDGMENTS WORK
The critical problem for presumptive judgments is to get
both parties to accept the presumptive award when either party can collapse the presumption so easily. For instance, if the
presumptive award is $15,000, it is evident that a plaintiff who
expects to receive only $5000 from an individual trial would
jump at the presumptive award, but a rational defendant would
want to challenge the award. The opposite is true when the
plaintiff expects a $25,000 recovery in an individual trial; the
defendant would be thrilled to escape with a $15,000 payment,
but the plaintiff will push for a full recovery. It appears that

assumptions that presumptive averaging is the least expensive way to determine damages and that the social gains from a class action adopting this approach exceed the costs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (permitting class certification only when, among other requirements, the “class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); cf. Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565 (2013)
(arguing that class actions should be certified only when they yield a net social
benefit).
72. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
73. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 14, at 841–51. For a general discussion
of some of the issues involved in sampling and the use of statistics, see FED.
JUDICIAL CTR. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211–502 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE
MANUAL]. See also Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18
CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 299–303 (2011) (describing the use of statistical sampling
in various cases).
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the only cases that presumptive averaging will eliminate are
those that, by coincidence, are worth exactly $15,000.
Presumptive averaging, however, takes advantage of the
reality that the party wishing to rebut the presumption must
incur costs to do so. If it will cost a person $20,000 to contest
the presumption and the effort can be expected to effect only a
$10,000 change in the award, then the economically rational
74
response is to accept the presumptive award. More generally,
if X equals the presumptive judgment, C -1 equals the costs to
75
the plaintiff of proving that award, and C -2 equals the costs to
the plaintiff of proving that the plaintiff is entitled to individual judgment P × L, then the plaintiff will accept the presumptive judgment X as long as
X – C -1 > (P × L) – C -2,
and will challenge the judgment when
X – C -1 < (P × L) – C -2.
Another way to express the same idea is that a plaintiff
will challenge the presumptive award only when the net expected award from an individual trial is greater than the net
76
presumptive award; otherwise, the plaintiff will not.
The converse proposition is true for the defendant. If it will
cost a defendant $20,000 to contest the presumptive $15,000
judgment, then the economically rational defendant will simply
pay the award. More generally, if X equals the presumptive
judgment, C•-1 equals the cost of providing a plaintiff with this
74. I loosen this assumption to account for repeat players. See infra Part
II.B.3.
75. These costs will arise from various sources. For instance, some portion
of the expenses for trying the sample cases may be spread across the unsampled cases. In addition, attorney’s fees and case-specific expenses may also be
deducted from the presumptive award. Cf. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.
472, 479–82 (1980) (affirming the use of a common-fund approach to pay class
counsel’s fee out of the fund from which class members are compensated).
76. On the assumption that a plaintiff is risk-neutral, the plaintiff’s net
expected recovery in an individual lawsuit is determined by the familiar formula (P × L) – C , where P represents the probability of recovery, L the
amount of the recovery, and C the costs incurred by the plaintiff in prosecuting the case. See POSNER, supra note 21, § 21.1 (describing this calculus in the
context of the Due Process Clause); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 57 (1982) (discussing how risk-neutral parties
make decisions about filing or maintaining a lawsuit based on expected value,
“discounting possible outcomes by their probabilities”). I discuss the effect of a
plaintiff’s different preferences for risk (in other words, being a risk taker or
being risk-averse) on the plaintiff’s decision to challenge the presumption infra
notes 116–119 and accompanying text.
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77

award, and C•-2 equals the costs to the defendant of proving
that a plaintiff is entitled to individual award P × L, then the
defendant will pay the presumptive award X as long as
X + C•-1 < (P × L) + C•-2,
and will challenge the award when
X + C•-1 > (P × L) + C•-2.
Put differently, a defendant will challenge the presumptive
judgment only when the expected payment from an individual
trial, inclusive of litigation costs, is lower than the gross
amount of the presumptive award plus the cost of providing
78
79
this compensation; otherwise, the defendant will not.
Therefore, the extent of the parties’ mutual willingness to
accept the presumptive award is essentially defined by the size
of their litigation costs in individual trials. For instance, assume that there are one hundred cases, and that random sampling of ten cases provides statistically valid information about
the remainder. The average award of these ten trials is
$15,000, which then becomes the presumptive award to all
class members. Plaintiffs who opt for the award will receive a
net amount of $12,000 (after deduction of $3000 to account for
their pro rata share of expenses and fees in the sampled trials).
The defendant will spend $1000 investigating each unsampled
case and making the payment to plaintiffs who opt for the
award. The expenses of an individual damages trial would be
$10,000 apiece for the plaintiff and defendant. Finally, assume
that, of the ninety unsampled cases, twelve would involve expected recoveries between $0 and $5999; twenty between $6000
and $12,000; forty between $12,001 and $18,000, fifteen between $18,000 and $22,000, and three above $22,000.
77. These costs are likely to be minimal. They include the cost of evaluating a plaintiff’s claim to see if the presumptive award should be challenged
(even though it ultimately is not), as well as the administrative cost of making
the payment itself.
78. Unlike the plaintiff, the defendant is unconcerned with the net average recovery (X – C -1) because it pays the gross amount of the award (X) to
each plaintiff who accepts the presumptive judgment. The defendant has also
already expended money in the litigation process that culminated in the sampling trials and the calculation of the presumptive award, but at this point
those are sunk costs. The defendant’s goal now is to minimize future costs.
79. If a defendant is risk-neutral, the maximum that the defendant would
be willing to pay a plaintiff in an individual lawsuit is (P × L) + C•, where C•
represents the costs incurred by the defendant in defending the case. For a
discussion of the influence of risk preferences on the defendant’s decision to
either pay the presumptive judgment or fight it, see infra notes 116–119 and
accompanying text.
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In these circumstances, the defendant has an incentive to
contest the presumptive award in the twelve cases with the
80
lowest value; conversely, the three plaintiffs with the highestvalue claims also have an incentive to reject the presumptive
81
judgment. A presumptive-judgment approach does not eliminate all trials; on the hypothetical numbers that I have provided, fifteen cases will be litigated individually, in addition to the
ten cases that were randomly sampled. But the process cuts out
82
at least seventy-five trials.
Of course, the numbers that I have used are highly styl83
ized, intended to show the operation of the presumption. The
following section raises a series of real-world difficulties with
presumptive judgments, and then suggests solutions to remedy
them.
B. FIVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The presumptive-judgment approach assumes that the
parties are rational economic actors who act to maximize their
own welfare. But the parties may not act rationally; or in acting
rationally to advance their own self-interest, they may not act
in a way most conducive to society’s best interests. This section
explores a series of circumstances in which one or the other of
these circumstances pertains. It begins, however, with a more

80. In the lowest-value cases, the value of X + C•-1 ($15,000 plus $1000)
exceeds the value of (P × L) + C•-2 (a maximum of $5999 plus $10,000). Because
opting for the presumptive award is therefore more expensive than individual
litigation, the defendant will litigate.
81. In the highest-value cases, the value of X – C -1 ($15,000 less $3000) is
lower than the value of (P × L) – C -2 (a minimum of $22,001 less $10,000). Because opting for the presumptive award is therefore less advantageous to these claimants than individual litigation, the highest-value plaintiffs will litigate.
82. In the end, it may not be necessary to conduct all fifteen trials. As
more trials are conducted, the parties will obtain more precise information
about the value of the claims and may then be able to settle some of the contested cases. For those cases that require trial, appointing a special master to
preside over the trials is an option that would limit the burden on the judiciary. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii) (authorizing a court to appoint a master
to “resolve a difficult computation of damages”).
83. Indeed, a full model would treat P × L and the other variables as a
distribution (assigning to certain outcomes certain probabilities) rather than a
single number. See Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 699, 718 n.92 (2013). In deciding whether to accept a presumptive
award, however, a party would still likely reduce this distribution to a single
number.
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technical issue involving the calculation of the presumptive
award.
1. Outlier Verdicts and the Presumptive “Average”
In the last section I assumed that the presumptive average
was $15,000, but I did not explain how the court should calculate that figure. In the classic form of trial by statistics, the average is determined by including all the verdicts—including defense verdicts (which are assigned a value of $0) and high-value
verdicts. With presumptive averaging, however, the parties
have an incentive to try the unsampled cases in which the costs
of trial for them are less than the marginal gain from their expected recovery in relation to the presumptive average. The
random sample may include some of the same type of “outlier”
claims. Because these outlier claims would be tried in any
event, an argument can be made not to include these verdicts
when calculating the presumptive average.
In concrete terms, assume that we expect the cost of an individual trial to each side to be $10,000, and that the ten sample trials yield one defense verdict, two verdicts of $13,000, four
of $15,000, two of $17,000, and one of $50,000. In the classic
form of trial by statistics, all the verdicts are thrown together,
for an average of $17,000. Had they been unsampled cases,
however, two of these claims were likely to have been tried under a presumptive-averaging process: the defense verdict and
the $50,000 claim. If we exclude these claims in calculating the
mean, then the average verdict of the remaining eight claims is
84
$15,000.
In a world of perfect information, the correct approach is to
exclude the outlier claims in determining the presumptive average; then defendants pay the amount of compensation that
exactly matches the harm they cause. But courts do not possess
perfect information. They do not know, for instance, exactly
what the costs of trying the unsampled cases will be (a figure
that I assumed to be $10,000 for each party). Without that
basic datum, a court cannot know precisely which cases to include or exclude. Moreover, in all likelihood the actual cost to
84. In the example, a presumptive average that excludes the outlier
claims is less than a presumptive average that includes them, so that the defendant gains an advantage from excluding these claims. The opposite result
could occur if the sampled claims had more defense verdicts or no high-value
outlier claims. In other words, the choice of method for calculating the presumptive average does not invariably favor either plaintiffs or defendants.
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try an unsampled claim will vary from case to case. Because
this actual cost is critical to defining which cases are outliers
(and therefore excludable from the presumptive average), the
court may have a difficult time identifying the outliers. Indeed,
some of the outlier cases may have been ones in which the parties would have accepted the presumptive average. For instance, if the defendant had paid $20,000 to achieve its sole defense verdict, the defendant may have preferred to take the
presumptive average rather than go to trial. (It was unable to
do so, however, because of the need to sample randomly.)
Should such an outlier be counted as a claim worth the presumptive average rather than a claim worth $0? To avoid these
difficulties, a court might choose the administratively simpler
and ultimately less expensive solution of using the results of all
the cases, including the outliers, in calculating the amount of
the presumptive judgment; the costs of obtaining a more accurate average may outweigh the gains from greater accuracy.
Other solutions for calculating the presumptive award are
also possible. A solution used among statisticians is to replace
the arithmetic mean with the median (which, on the figures in
85
the hypothetical, is coincidentally $15,000). Another is to discard the outliers (often defined as the top and bottom ten percent of the results) and then to figure the presumptive average
on the basis of the “trimmed mean”—although this technique is
86
controversial because it excludes data.
There exists no one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of
outliers. If a random sample is well constructed, the issue
should be minimal. Although the problem is brought to the fore
in a system of presumptive judgments, the same concerns exist
in the classic form of trial by statistics. Once the trials conclude, the court, with the aid of statistical experts, must determine the most statistically appropriate way to represent the

85. See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 238 (noting that “studies
of damage awards in tort cases find that the mean is larger than the median”
and that “[i]f one is seeking a single, representative number for the awards,
the median may be more useful than the mean”); cf. In re Educ. Testing Serv.
Praxis Principles of Learning & Teaching: Grades 7–12 Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d
612, 624 (E.D. La. 2006) (adopting the median of prior individual settlements
to determine the fair value of a class settlement).
86. See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 240 (discussing the reasons to discard outlier values in computing the mean); Stephen M. Stigler, The
Asymptotic Distribution of the Trimmed Mean, 1 ANNALS STAT. 472 (1973)
(discussing potential problems with using the “trimmed mean” and possible
solutions to those problems).
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average result in view of the ultimate goals of the process: de87
terrence and adequate compensation.
The presence of a significant number of outliers may well
signal a lack of homogeneity within the sample. That concern
merits separate consideration.
2. A Lack of Homogeneity
In many cases, presumptive judgments will work best only
when the results cluster close enough to the average that the
parties mutually have little incentive to litigate the individual
claims. For instance, assume a random sample of ten claims in
which two claims result in defense verdicts, two result in $2000
verdicts, two in $5000 verdicts, two in $18,000 verdicts, and
two in $40,000 verdicts. Further assume that we use the
arithmetic mean of the ten claims ($15,000) as the average, and
that each party will spend $10,000 in individual trials. If the
sample is representative of the remaining claims, the parties
will jointly accept the presumptive award in only 20% of the
cases; one party or the other has an incentive to contest the
presumption in the remaining 80%. With so little promise of
eliminating trials, the presumptive judgment may not be a useful device to resolve the individual claims. On the other hand, if
the results of the sample trials yield a situation in which only
10% of the cases might result in individual trials, the process
seems more promising—unless, perhaps, there were a million
88
claims.
The ideal of few outlier claims puts an important limitation
on the use of presumptive judgments. The approach is most
likely to be useful when the defendant’s liability to the plaintiffs is essentially uniform and the damages cluster within the
boundaries established by the parties’ costs of trying individual
89
claims. Conversely, presumptive averaging is least likely to be
87. The place at which the average is set also has an effect on the parties’
incentives to litigate. If the selected method yields a higher average than other
available methods, then fewer plaintiffs have an incentive to contest the presumption, but the defendant has an incentive to dispute a greater number of
low-value cases. The opposite is true if the selected method yields a lower average than other available methods. Although statistical validity, deterrence,
and compensation should be primary considerations in selecting an averaging
method, choosing a method that reduces the likelihood of individual litigation
may be relevant as a second-order consideration.
88. If presumptive averaging is to be useful, the percentage of the claims
that are outliers requiring trial must decrease as the absolute number of
claims increases.
89. The formula set out in the text following note 75 determines the upper
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helpful when there is significant variability among the claims—
either in terms of the defendant’s liability or in terms of the
amount of damages. A court facing such variability has a limited number of options. One is to break the claims into subclasses in which the variability of injury is less, and to use presumptive judgments for each subclass. But the creation of
subclasses increases the number of sample trials that must occur, and thus reduces the efficiency gains from averaging. In
some cases courts could use the data from the sample trials to
construct regression models that determine the value of claims
with particular characteristics (age, gender, salary), thus ren90
dering subclasses unnecessary. Another option is to extract
general information from the sampled claims in order to reduce
the issues remaining in individual trials; for instance, the court
could ask the juries in the sampled cases to itemize damages,
and then fashion a presumptive award for a common element
like pain and suffering while conducting discrete mini-trials on
variable issues like lost earning capacity or medical expenses.
A fourth option is to suffer the consequences of outliers; if the
number of claims is not overwhelming, reducing their number
by even 20% might be a useful time saver. Only as a last resort
should courts reject presumptive awards in favor of some other
91
form for resolving the dispute.
Presumptive averaging’s need for a sample containing little
variability also carries a risk. As we have seen, homogeneity
within a sample is valuable in its own right; it helps to ensure
the validity of the sample results, thus making extrapolation
92
possible. A homogenous sample carries a secondary benefit in
a system of presumptive averaging: fewer cases in which a party’s expected gains from contesting the presumptive average
will exist, and therefore fewer individual trials will occur. But
the two types of homogeneity are not the same thing. A court
boundary, and the formula set out in the text following note 77 determines the
lower boundary.
90. See Kadane, supra note 73, at 304. I thank Ed Cheng for this idea.
91. This other form might not be a class action, and might even mean that
a defendant will not be subject to liability for most or even all of the harm that
it caused. Because presumptive judgments should be used only when they are
better than alternatives, see supra note 71 and accompanying text, the use of
this alternative form is necessarily worse than the use of presumptive judgments. But as long as the legal system insists on the right of defendants to
make individual challenges to liability and damages determinations, see supra
notes 58–66 and accompanying text, the cost of not using presumptive judgments is one that the legal system must bear.
92. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

TIDMARSH_4fmt

2015]

4/10/2015 11:48 AM

RESURRECTING TRIAL BY STATISTICS

1487

must be careful not to let the tail wag the dog: in other words,
93
not to let the desire to construct a sample with few outliers
overcome the obligation to conduct scientifically valid random
sampling.
For this reason, the use of presumptive judgments, in the
94
main, is least likely to be helpful in positive-value cases that
contain significant fact-specific variations in either liability or
damages. Conversely, it is most likely to be helpful in positivevalue cases with little variability on the issues of liability and
95
damages and in those “negative-value” cases in which the parties have little to no incentive to contest the claims individually. Thus, presumptive judgments might work well for a large
single-event catastrophe, such as an airplane crash or a factory
explosion that levels a neighborhood—although even here significant variations in damages may exist and subclassing may
be necessary. The same is true of a consumer claim in which a
defendant has illegally overcharged ten million customers by
$.10 per transaction, with no customer having more than one
thousand transactions (or $100 in damages). In a perfect world,
if the cost of determining the damages to each consumer exceeded $100 for both the plaintiff and the defendant, then neither side has an incentive to contest the presumptive award of,
93. What I mean by “outlier” in this context is a case whose factual or legal posture is sufficiently different from those of other claims in the sample
that a difference in outcome is both expected and is large enough that the
plaintiff or defendant would have had an incentive to reject the presumptive
judgment.
94. “Positive-value” cases are those in which the amount of money at
stake is sufficiently great that the plaintiff has an incentive to bring an individual lawsuit.
95. In “negative-value” (or “large-scale, small-claim”) cases, the costs of
individual litigation for a plaintiff exceed the value of the claim, effectively
making the claim worthless. Class actions, which aggregate negative-value
claims, can make such claims financially viable. See Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1991). For this reason, courts have tended to be more
hospitable to the use of class actions in negative-value cases than in positivevalue cases. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997) (stating that, although Rule 23(b)(3) “does not exclude from certification
cases in which individual damages run high,” aggregation of small-value
claims is the core reason for using class actions); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (arguing that small-stakes cases present
“[t]he most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action”); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In most class
actions—and those the ones in which the rationale for the procedure is most
compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each class
member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”).
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say, $20 that random sampling yields. Of course, the world is
not perfect, as the following section explains.
3. Strategic Behavior
In the imperfect real world, the defendant has an incentive
to act strategically and object to the presumptive award in
many negative-value cases. Assume, for instance, that the presumptive average award is $20, that no plaintiff’s claim exceeds $100, and that it would cost the plaintiff and the defendant $2000 apiece to prove the exact amount of damages. As
long as the cost to the defendant of filing an objection to the
presumptive award is less than $20, the defendant will do so.
The reason is that, because the cost to the plaintiff of proving
individual damages ($2000) exceeds the value of the claim (no
more than $100), an economically rational plaintiff will drop
the claim. Thus, even though the defendant’s cost of defending
against an individual claim is also high, it can avoid any liability by filing an objection.
Given that a prime instance for the use of presumptive
judgments is this sort of negative-value claim, the defendant’s
strategic behavior threatens the entire presumptive-average
approach. But the problem of strategic behavior is greater than
the negative-value situation. It is possible that a plaintiff (or
the defendant) may reject the presumptive award merely to extort a higher (or lower) payment. For instance, if we assume
that the presumptive average award is $15,000, and that the
costs to each side of proving individual damages is $10,000, a
plaintiff with a claim whose expected value is $15,000 may reject the presumptive award and seek to settle the case with the
96
defendant for $24,000. Likewise, the defendant may reject the
presumptive award even for claims with an expected value of
$15,000 and seek to settle for $6000. Especially if there is an
imbalance in bargaining power between the sides, one party
may try to impose costs to obtain a better deal.
Solutions to the problem of strategic behavior are at hand,
although they are rather radical. One is to require a trial of any
96. A comparable phenomenon has been observed in class-action practice:
class members who either object to a class settlement or opt out of the class in
order to garner a settlement from the defendant that exceeds the award for
other class members. See John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action
Professional Objectors: What To Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865
(2012) (discussing objectors); D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons
in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (2013) (discussing optouts).
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case in which either party rejects the presumptive award; with
the prospect of extracting a more favorable settlement gone,
neither party has an incentive to act in a strategic fashion. This
solution seems to run counter to the principle that settlements
97
should be favored over litigation, but in fact the opposite is
true. The point of mandating trial for those who reject the presumptive award is to provide the parties with an incentive to
accept the presumptive judgment, thus encouraging settlement.
But this solution is not perfect, for it lets a repeat player (likely
the defendant) who is willing to incur the costs of trial establish
a reputation for litigiousness that may discourage the assertion
of claims against it.
A better way to avoid strategic behavior is to allocate all of
the reasonable costs of an individual proceeding—including an
attorney’s fee—to the party who rejects the presumptive
98
99
award. Unless another fee-shifting provision requires it, the
proposal does not shift costs (including the costs of the sample
trials) that were incurred before the presumptive award is determined. The effect of this limited cost shifting is to cut off a
party’s reason to reject a settlement for extortionate purposes.
Because the rejecting party must pay the opponent’s expenses
in continuing to litigate, it can no longer use the opponent’s
97. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013) (noting “the
public policy favoring settlement of disputes”); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 407 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing “the
policy favoring the settlement of protracted litigation”); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City
Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2013) (articulating “a policy preference favoring voluntary settlement in class actions”).
98. A variation of this proposal is to require an objecting party to bear the
expenses of the opposing party unless the objecting party obtains an award
that falls outside the boundary within which an actor who is not acting strategically would accept the award. Thus, a plaintiff who obtained an award
higher than the boundary established in the formula found in the text following note 75 would not be responsible for the defendant’s costs. Likewise, a defendant who obtained an award lower than the boundary established in the
formula set out in the text following note 77 would not be responsible for the
plaintiff’s costs. But informational problems beset this idea; it is easier in theory than in practice to compute the boundary lines, and the number may not
even be knowable at the time when a party must decide whether to reject a
presumptive award.
99. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (permitting a court to assess “excess
costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees reasonably incurred” against a party “who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously”); 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (permitting a court to award “a reasonable attorney’s
fee” to a “prevailing party” in certain civil-rights cases); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4)
(permitting a court to award a sanction, including “part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation” of
the obligations contained in Rule 11(b)).
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fear of incurring those expenses as a cudgel to extract a more
favorable settlement.
This approach also has a salutary secondary effect: it reduces the number of outlier claims. If we assume that the average award is $15,000 and it would cost each party $10,000 to
try an individual claim, a party considering the rejection of the
presumptive award must now factor in not only its own costs in
an individual trial ($10,000) but also the costs of the opponent
(an additional $10,000). Thus, a plaintiff has no incentive to reject the presumptive award unless the expected recovery exceeds $35,000, and a defendant never has an incentive to reject
the presumptive award (since it will be cheaper to pay the pre100
sumptive $15,000 than to incur $20,000 in legal expenses).
Given these numbers, an objection to this approach emerges. Plaintiffs in some cases (those in which the expected damages exceed $35,000) have an incentive to reject the presumptive award, while the defendant never does. That fact suggests
that the defendant will be required to pay too much; it will pay
$15,000 to most claimants, but more than $35,000 to those who
reject the presumptive award and successfully prove their entitlement to a higher award. As a consequence, the defendant
will be overdeterred.
This concern arises only in positive-value cases (in which
101
class certification is often difficult for other reasons), and only
when neither subclassing nor a similar technique is capable of
preventing upside outliers. Even here, the problem is confined
to those cases in which the presumptive award (say, $15,000) is
less than the combined costs to plaintiff and defendant of an
individual trial (say, $20,000). Moreover, within this subset of
cases, if the number of outliers is small, the cost savings from
not expending $20,000 in litigation expenses in each avoided
individual trial may well exceed the occasional excessive com102
Therefore, this
pensation that the defendant must pay.
100. In this analysis I assume that both parties will incur the full $10,000
in expenses; in other words, the case will not settle short of trial. I do not
mean to suggest that the cost-shifting approach must be joined with the first
approach, which made individual trial mandatory. Under the cost-shifting approach, the party rejecting the presumptive award must pay all further expenses incurred by both sides, whether the claim terminates in a settlement or
a trial. If the parties settle short of trial, then the costs that the rejecting party
must bear are only a portion of $10,000.
101. See supra note 95.
102. Recall that, in economic terms, the goal of a legal system is to reduce
the sum of accident costs, accident avoidance costs, and administrative costs
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overdeterrence problem is greater in theory than it is likely to
be in practice. But I acknowledge the seeming unfairness of a
system that appears to work as a one-way ratchet favoring
plaintiffs and exposing defendants to the risk of excessive deterrence. One way to even up the seeming disparity is to eliminate cost shifting when the defendant proves that it is not liable to an individual plaintiff. Drawing the cost-shifting line
103
when the defendant prevails on liability is not irrational.
To be clear, however, it is not evident that adding this refinement to the cost-shifting approach is useful—especially given the narrow range of cases in which overdeterrence is a concern. The refinement also has the undesirable effect of
providing defendants with an additional incentive to reject a
presumptive award; it thus may encourage some of the strategic behavior that the pure cost-shifting approach avoids. But if
a court is worried about overdeterrence, denying cost shifting
in cases in which the defendants are not liable is a better solution than a system that rejects presumptive judgments and
leaves plaintiffs to the vagaries of whatever other enforcement
mechanisms they can employ.
With or without the exclusion of cost shifting when the defendant prevails on liability, the cost-shifting approach is subject to a substantial criticism: it creates an exception to the
104
“American rule,” under which each party bears its own costs,
and invokes a “loser-pays” rule (or “English rule”) that non-U.S.
105
legal systems adopt. Thus, cost shifting seems out of step
with the ordinary approach to fees used in American litigation.
(such as legal expenses), and that legal costs consist both of error costs and
direct litigation expenses. See supra note 21. Any excessive compensation that
results from cost shifting is an error cost, which is nonetheless worth incurring
as long as the cost is less than the error costs associated with the strategic behavior that would occur in the absence of cost shifting plus the direct litigation
costs that are avoided due to cost shifting.
103. While not irrational, it is also not logically compelled. This approach
creates a different kind of inequality: plaintiffs who reject the presumptive
approach must always bear all of the costs of doing so, while defendants bear
all of the costs only when they are found to be liable.
104. E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975) (describing the American rule).
105. See id.; James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 225, 225, 229 (1995) (“Throughout most of the Western world the
English rule applies, and the losing party in a dispute is liable for the winner’s
legal fees, up to a reasonable limit.”); Edward F. Sherman, Transnational Perspectives Regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC.
510, 523 (2006) (“[M]ost of the world follows the ‘loser pays’ standard.”).
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But this criticism will not succeed. The American rule is subject
106
to numerous exceptions, both statutory and rule-based. A
particularly pertinent exception is Rule 68, which allows a
court to shift the defendant’s costs of continuing to litigate a
case to the plaintiff when the defendant makes an offer to allow
judgment on specified terms, the plaintiff rejects the offer, and
“the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more fa107
vorable than the unaccepted offer . . . .” The cost-shifting idea
here is analogous if we conceive of the presumptive judgment
as an offer of judgment. Of course, Rule 68 and presumptivejudgment cost shifting are not identical: the latter applies
108
equally to plaintiffs and defendants, and it shifts costs automatically on rejection of the presumptive judgment rather than
in situations in which the judgment is less favorable than the
offer. Both of these differences are necessary to prevent the
parties from engaging in strategic behavior that would under109
mine the effectiveness of presumptive judgments.

106. For a handful of these provisions, see supra note 99. For a more comprehensive list, see HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDS
OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES (2008)
(listing approximately 200 fee-shifting statutes and other exceptions to the
American rule, including common law provisions and procedural rules).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).
108. By its terms, Rule 68 comes into play only when “a party defending
against a claim . . . serve[s] on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on
specified terms . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a).
109. Rule 68’s application only to plaintiffs who reject an offer of judgment
has long been criticized. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361–67 (1983) (proposing amendments that would have made Rule 68 equally applicable to plaintiffs
and defendants); Edward F. Sherman & Christopher M. Fairman, Interplay
Between Mediation and Offer of Judgment Rule Sanctions, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 327, 333 (2011) (“By limiting the application to defendants, Federal Rule 68 prohibits the potential benefits of its provisions from an entire
class of litigant—plaintiffs.”). If presumptive-judgment cost shifting were similarly applied only to plaintiffs, defendants have a reason to act strategically in
rejecting the presumptive award, thus defeating much of the good that presumptive judgments can do. Likewise, allowing a party to avoid cost shifting
as long as the ultimate award is more favorable to that party in absolute dollars (for instance, not requiring cost shifting when the presumptive award is
$15,000, and either a rejecting plaintiff receives $15,001 or a rejecting defendant is ordered to pay $14,999) gives both parties too much room to act strategically. A common purpose behind both Rule 68 and presumptive averaging—
to foster settlement rather than litigation—is better advanced in the latter
case by making the cost shift automatic. That is especially true because presumptive averaging has an important secondary purpose—to make feasible
the aggregation needed to achieve a proper level of deterrence—that is better
realized through automatic cost shifting.
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The existence of cost shifting will affect the parties’ behavior in a salutary fashion. As a general matter, a loser-pays (or
cost-shifting) regime creates an incentive to assert claims that
are more likely to prevail, while the American rule creates an
110
incentive to bring claims of less certain merit. Thus, shifting
costs to the party who rejects the presumptive award means
that the party likely will accept the presumptive award unless
the party has a high likelihood of proving an entitlement to a
higher award (in the case of a plaintiff) or a lower award (in the
111
case of a defendant). In contrast to the usual criticism of the
loser-pays rule—that it discourages the filing of meritorious but
112
risky claims —discouraging the pursuit of individual claims
leaves the presumptive award in place. Presumptive-judgment
cost shifting does not thwart enforcement of meritorious claims.
Rather, the point of cost shifting is to discourage socially
113
costly litigation. The sample trials have already established
the level of compensation that leads to optimal deterrence and
114
are presumptively accurate. From a social-utility perspective,
individual trials should occur only when the gains from additional accuracy exceed the costs of achieving that level of accu115
racy. In order to ensure that individual trials occur only in
110. See Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does Procedure Matter?, 152 PUB. CHOICE 181, 196–98 (2012) (analyzing
incentives to litigate claims of uncertain merit under the loser-pays and American rules); see also Hughes & Snyder, supra note 105, at 229 (discussing the
effects of fee shifting on claim quality).
111. A “higher” award is one in which the plaintiff’s marginal gain from the
individual award (computed as the difference between the value of the individual award and the value of the rejected presumptive award) exceeds the
joint additional costs of litigating the individual claim. A “lower” award is one
in which the defendant’s marginal gain from the individual award (computed
as the difference between the value of the rejected presumptive award and the
value of the individual award) exceeds the joint additional costs of litigating
the individual claim.
112. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths
to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation Background
Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 888 (noting that the English Rule “may excessively discourage the pressing of plausible but not clearly winning claims, particularly when the prospective plaintiffs are strongly risk averse”).
113. See, e.g., id. at 887–91.
114. See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 21, 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the interconnections in the economic analysis of due process and trial by statistics);
cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 343–48 (1976) (holding, in part,
that the Due Process Clause permits departures from the adversarial process
when the savings in litigation expense exceed the expected loss in the accuracy
of the judgment).
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this circumstance, the party seeking to depart from the presumptive award must fully internalize all the costs of its decision to reject the award.
This analysis, however, assumes that the parties are riskneutral and operate with perfect information—in other words,
that they will make the correct decision about accepting or rejecting the presumptive award. The following section examines
the validity of these assumptions.
4. Risk Preference and Imperfect Information
The presumptive-judgment approach assumes that the
parties can make accurate decisions to accept or reject presumptive awards. Any distortions in the capacity of the parties
to do so can affect the validity of the procedure. Two principal
sources of potential distortion are excessive risk taking or risk
avoidance on the one hand, and imperfect information about
the expected value of the individual claims on the other.
With respect to risk, the main concern is risk taking. If the
parties are mutually risk-averse, they will underestimate their
chances in individual litigation, and will opt for the certainty of
the presumptive award. Therefore, mutual risk aversion cuts
down on individual litigation, and does not raise the specter of
116
an excessive number of individual claims. Risk taking, on the
other hand, can have the opposite effect. A party may be unduly optimistic about its chances in individual litigation, and reject a presumptive award that it should accept. As a result, the
marginal gains from enhanced accuracy are likely to be less
than the costs of the individual proceeding, causing a net social
loss.
Although risk taking may be a concern with some class actions, it is not an objection that should derail presumptive
judgments across the board. In most negative-value class actions, not even the most risk-loving plaintiff will reject a presumptive award of $20 when the maximum possible award is
$100 and it would cost $20,000 ($10,000 each for the plaintiff’s
costs and the defendant’s costs) to obtain that award; the same
is true of the defendant when a defense victory is achievable

116. Less individual litigation is not socially beneficial if the cost of litigation is less than the marginal increase in accuracy. As long as the parties are
mutually risk-averse, however, it is likely that both plaintiffs and defendants
failed to contest some awards that they should have, so that the effect of risk
aversion somewhat washes out.
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117

only at an expense of $20,000. Even in positive-value class actions, the spectrum of risk preferences across class members
means that risk-averse and risk-taking behaviors are likely to
cancel out; some class members won’t litigate when they should
(the risk avoiders), and others will litigate when they shouldn’t
118
(the risk takers). Although the defendant’s preference to take
risk (and thus to reject the presumptive award more often than
it should) may be more fixed, from a macroeconomic viewpoint
the risk-avoiding preference of some defendants in some cases
should be an adequate corrective to the risk-taking preferences
of other defendants in other cases. Furthermore, victims and
119
injurers generally tend to avoid risk, so concerns about the
social cost of excessive risk taking are misplaced. Finally, the
results of the sample trials should inject a degree of realism into the calculations of parties that might otherwise be unduly
optimistic about their prospects at trial.
Relatedly, informational deficiencies can make it difficult
for parties to make socially beneficial litigation decisions. In
particular, in order for presumptive judgments to work, a party
deciding whether to accept or reject a presumptive award must
calculate the net expected value of an individual claim. To
make a correct assessment, the party and its lawyer must have
accurate information about the probability of recovery, the
quantum of recovery if the claim is successful, and the cost of
120
achieving that outcome. To the extent that errors in these
117. I am assuming that the party who rejects the award must pay the reasonable costs of both sides in litigating the award individually; otherwise, a
risk-taking defendant could have an incentive to challenge individual awards
if it believes that doing so will keep other plaintiffs from asserting claims. See
supra Part II.B.3.
118. This is not true when the claims are highly homogenous, so that no
claimant has a claim whose expected value exceeds the presumptive judgment
by enough to justify the cost of litigation. In this situation, risk aversion only
reinforces the correct decision not to litigate individually, while those who are
risk takers may impose social costs by litigating individual claims that they
should not. To the extent that the costs of risk aversion and risk taking do not
cancel each other out, the costs are part of the price that society pays for the
right of individuals to contest the fact and amount of injury. See supra notes
58–64 and accompanying text.
119. See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 701, 708 (2012) (“In many real-world settings the
victim and the injurer will be risk-averse.”); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1408–16
(2003) (reviewing literature suggesting that plaintiffs are often risk averse,
but defendants may sometimes be risk neutral in large-scale litigation).
120. In other words, plaintiffs and defendants need to know the values of
the variables set out in the respective formulas in Part II.A.
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calculations induce a party to accept a presumptive award, they
are less troublesome because the errors eliminate individual
121
trials. But recent work has shown that the opposite problem
may be more prevalent: lawyers are subject to cognitive illusions that often lead them to reject settlements and prolong lit122
igation.
Once again, informational difficulties operate over a fairly
narrow range of class actions. In a negative-value class action,
parties and their lawyers are unlikely to make informational
mistakes of such a magnitude that they become convinced that
a claim with an objective value of $100 is worth litigating at an
objective cost of $20,000. In both negative-value and positivevalue cases, the parties are not in the position that ordinary litigants and lawyers are in, because they already possess significant information about the value of their claims. One of the
benefits of presumptive judgments is that parties have a group
of similar cases—the sample verdicts used to calculate the presumptive award—against which they can measure their expec123
tations. Granted, parties and their lawyers may see distinctions between the sample results and their specific case that
make other cases an imperfect guide to the expected value of
their claim, but prior verdicts should establish guideposts that
frame their decision. Remaining errors may wash out, as parties and their lawyers will be too optimistic about some claims
(and thus try cases they should not) and too pessimistic about
others (and thus not try cases that they should). To the extent
that the errors do not wash out, the costs of those errors are attributable to the felt social need that caused the rejection of trial by statistics in its pure form: the desire to give parties the
opportunity to contest whether and to what extent each indi124
vidual was harmed.
In short, risk preferences and informational limitations
may cause some suboptimal decisions that may lead to more
individual trials and more cost than the ideal. As the use of the
word “may” (twice) in the last sentence shows, it is not evident
that a system of presumptive averaging will invariably result
121. As described supra note 116, a reduction in individual trials may
make a system of presumptive judgment work better, but fewer trials is not
necessarily socially optimal; sometimes the marginal gains in accuracy outweigh the cost of trial.
122. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions
Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 576–80 (2013).
123. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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in excessive trials. There are compensating factors—such as
the risk aversion of most parties, the availability of the information supplied by sample verdicts, the prevalence of negativevalue claims in class-action practice, and the wash-out effect
that occurs when risk preferences or informational limitations
lead some parties not to try claims that should be tried—that
minimize this concern.
5. Political Legitimacy
A final concern is whether a court can establish a system of
presumptive judgments on its own or must instead await legislation. Two of the critiques of the pure trial-by-statistics ap125
proach—that it violated Erie and the Rules Enabling Act —
boil down to the claim that trial by statistics works a change in
substantive law that federal courts lack the institutional competence to make. Is the same true of the modified system that I
have called presumptive judgments?
The answer breaks into two parts. First, as a general matter, the answer is that presumptive judgments do not present
the political-legitimacy problems that trial by statistics did.
The critical difference between the two is the ability of the parties in the system of presumptive judgments to contest the average award. This is no small matter, for the damning feature
of trial by statistics was the inability of parties to prove that a
particular claimant suffered no injury or suffered an injury dif126
ferent in amount from the average. With presumptive judgments, parties retain the fundamental substantive right to contest the fact and quantum of injury. The parties may choose not
to exercise that right; the expected costs of trying an individual
claim may outweigh the gains of doing so. But providing choice
does not amount to an abridgment of a substantive right. As
the Supreme Court recently observed, “the fact that it is not
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that reme127
dy.”
Creating presumptions to aid the resolution of disputes is
128
part and parcel of the traditional judicial function. Over the
125. See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 40, 58–66 and accompanying text.
127. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
128. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907 (1992) (arguing that a broad system of presumptions can mediate between a system of rules and a system of discretion,
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years courts have created hundreds of presumptions. Many
are factual in nature; human experience has shown that when
fact A is true, it is likely that fact B is also true. Hence, courts
establish the presumption that, when a party proves fact A, the
130
jury can presume fact B (in the absence of contrary evidence).
Other presumptions blend factual and legal conclusions; when
fact A is true, then legal consequence C can also be presumed to
be true (in the absence of contrary evidence). For instance, a
blood alcohol level of .10% can create a presumption that the
131
driver was operating the car under the influence; similarly, in
a securities case, a court can presume that the shareholder
with the largest financial stake in the case should be the class
132
representative. Presumptive judgments act like this latter
type of presumption; from the facts that (1) the defendant’s action was wrongful toward people in the same position as the
plaintiff and (2) the average harm suffered by a representative
subset of similarly situated plaintiffs was $15,000, for instance,
the court presumes that this plaintiff was injured in the
amount of $15,000.
Presumptive averaging is the weakest form of presump133
tion, for it goes away as soon as a party contests it. Given
capturing the benefits of each system with fewer drawbacks).
129. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, § 5122.1 (“[T]he common law recognized scores of such presumptions.”); id. § 5125 (providing a non-exhaustive
list of more than 200 presumptions).
130. Courts regard some “presumptions” as “conclusive” or “irrebuttable”
even when evidence contrary to the presumption exists. Id. § 5122.1; see also
id. § 5123.1 n.14 (listing several conclusive presumptions contained in statutes). These devices are not true presumptions, but rather legal fictions designed to achieve certain substantive outcomes for policy reasons. Id.
§§ 5122.1, 5123.1. The pure trial-by-statistics approach, in which each unsampled plaintiff automatically received the average award, could be understood
as a type of conclusive presumption.
131. Id. § 5122.1.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012).
133. On the collapsing nature of the presumption, see supra note 70. The
effect of most evidentiary presumptions is stronger. The strongest “presumption” (to the extent that it can even be classified as one) is the irrebuttable
presumption. See supra note 130. When the opponent can rebut a presumption, the presumption typically retains some legal effect: either it allows the
jury to infer that the presumed fact is true or it switches the burden of persuasion to the opponent. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 70, §§ 5122.1, 5122.2
(discussing theories about the effect of a presumption and the approach of
Federal Rule of Evidence 301). With presumptive averaging, however, none of
the stronger effects of the presumption exists. Indeed, a stronger effect is not
even possible. Because it is not informed of the size of the average award in
the sampled cases, a jury can make no inference about the value of the present
case from the result of those cases.
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that courts have the power to establish stronger presumptions,
the power to create a weak presumption should raise few legitimacy concerns as long as the court has a rational basis for creating the presumption. And it clearly does. Courts have long
134
recognized that they have the authority to foster settlement
135
and efficiently resolve disputes. Presumptive judgments are
designed to meet these goals.
Indeed, although its solution was not exactly the “presumptive judgment,” one court obliquely hit upon this idea al136
most twenty-five years ago. In Langley v. Coughlin, class
members alleged that they were being confined in conditions
and under practices that violated the Constitution. They sought
injunctive relief to prevent future harm, as well as damages for
137
past violations. After settling the claims for injunctive relief,
the court faced the problem of determining the proper compen138
sation for past harm. In a report and recommendation that
the district judge adopted, the magistrate recognized the difficulty of awarding individual damages for past harm, and suggested that one option would be to award per diem damages to
139
each prisoner. The magistrate also proposed an alternative:
Alternatively, the Court could establish a presumptive per diem
award for each day during which conditions were of a given degree of
unconstitutional severity and then permit both plaintiffs and defendants to seek a variation—either up or down—for specific class members based upon a showing of unique individual circumstances. Very

134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); FED. R. CIV. P.
16(c)(2)(A) (granting the judge the case-management power to “formulat[e]
and simplify[] the issues”); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L) (granting the judge the
case-management power to “adopt[] special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve . . . unusual proof problems”); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(P) (granting the judge the case-management
power to “facilitat[e] in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(A) (granting the judge in a class
action the power “to prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in presenting evidence or argument”).
136. Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
137. Id. at 531.
138. Id. More specifically, after settlement of the injunctive claims, the defendants moved, inter alia, to decertify the class. Id. at 551. One of their arguments for decertification was the difficulty the plaintiffs faced in proving
individual damages. Id. at 557–59.
139. Id. at 558.
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few, if any, class members are likely to be the subject of such a sepa140
rate proceeding . . . .

The proposed solution in Langley varies from (and compares unfavorably to) presumptive judgments, principally because the magistrate apparently intended to determine the per
141
diem award without the benefit of random sampling. But it is
noteworthy that neither the magistrate nor the district judge
questioned their power to create a presumption. Given the
courts’ discretionary power to calculate the quantum of damag142
es in complex cases, the power to create a presumptive award
seems unassailable.
The second part of the legitimacy question concerns the
power of a court to order cost shifting onto the party that contests a presumptive award. Although there are many excep143
tions to the American rule, nearly all are either statutory or
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have
been subjected to a rulemaking process under authority dele144
gated by Congress. A small reserve of inherent judicial power
to order one party to pay another party’s costs exists, but it is
not clear that this power reaches the situation presented by
145
presumptive judgments.
Of course, the American rule is itself judge-made, and
146
therefore subject to judicial modification. In other contexts
judges have creatively modified the ordinary rules for attor147
ney’s fees to meet the needs of complex litigation. They also

140. Id.
141. Id. at 557–58.
142. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 104, 106 and accompanying text.
144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2012) (describing the scope of the delegation to the Supreme Court and the rulemaking process).
145. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (holding that a
court has the inherent power to sanction a party for bad-faith conduct, even
when some of the same conduct might be sanctionable under federal statutes
or the Federal Rules, but noting that a court must “exercise caution in invoking its inherent power”).
146. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257–
60 (1975) (describing the history and origin of the modern American rule).
147. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 769–72 (9th
Cir. 1977) (applying the “common fund doctrine,” under which “a private
plaintiff, or his attorney, whose efforts create, discover, increase or preserve a
fund to which others also have a claim is entitled to recover from the fund the
costs of his litigation, including attorneys’ fees,” to award lead counsel fees in a
class action); cf. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action
Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63
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possess a loosely defined reservoir of case-management power
148
from which cost shifting might be teased out. In short, it is at
least debatable that a judge could order cost shifting as part of
a presumptive-judgment scheme.
The prudent course, however, is to enact legislation or to go
through the rulemaking process to invest courts with this costshifting power. The American rule is so deeply embedded in the
structure of American litigation that alterations are best made
through a process that provides more political legitimacy than
149
a common-law pronouncement—at least at the federal level.
Because cost shifting is a linchpin of the presumptive-judgment
150
process, the fate of the process may hinge on legislative will
or judicial rulemaking.
But if a legislature or judicial-rulemaking body is willing to
go this far, would it not make sense for that body to go the extra step and enact the system for which presumptive judgments
are a second-best solution: trial by statistics? Not necessarily.
Trial by statistics is a more radical, and therefore less politically palatable, solution because it denies individuals the ability to
151
contest issues of causation and damages. For this reason, trial by statistics also constitutes a shift in the underlying substantive law, thus arguably putting it beyond the reach of judi152
cial rulemaking. Presumptive judgments, even with a costshifting component, do not raise the same concerns. True, shifting costs has an effect on the scope of substantive rights. But
153
the same is true of every procedural rule. An effect on substantive rights, in and of itself, does not delegitimize either cost

VAND. L. REV. 107, 109–11 (2010) (recognizing, but questioning, the present
application of the doctrine in multidistrict cases).
148. For the likeliest textual sources of this case-management power, see
supra note 135. See also In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 822 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (“District judges must have authority to manage their dockets, especially during massive litigation . . . .”).
149. The same analysis need not pertain in a state in which the state
courts enjoy broader authority to tailor legal processes to the needs of specific
forms of litigation.
150. See supra Part II.B.3.
151. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
152. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (requiring that Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”).
153. See Bone, supra note 22, at 909 (“Even the early twentieth-century
reformers understood that procedure affects outcome.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 891 (2011) (“[E]very ‘procedural’ rule changes entitlements and values of claims . . . .”).
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shifting in general or presumptive judgments in particular.
Presumptive averaging should attract legislators and judicial
rulemakers who are interested in finding a compromise that
captures many of the benefits of trial by statistics while imposing none of its side effects on the scope of substantive rights.
C. THE CASE FOR PRESUMPTIVE JUDGMENTS

Having fleshed out some necessary practical aspects of the
proposal, I turn to the broader argument for presumptive
judgments. Until now, I have made a series of smaller arguments to set the contours of presumptive judgments and evaluate objections to these contours. The picture that has emerged
is that of a second-best alternative to trial by statistics, made
necessary by a legal world in which the parties’ right to contest
the fact of injury (causation) and the amount of injury (damages) is sacrosanct. In such a world, trial by statistics is impossible, despite the evident deterrence and efficiency gains achievable. Indeed, as the discussion of the practical effects of
presumptive averaging made clear, presumptive averaging has
some efficiency and deterrence limitations that pure trial by
statistics does not: a substantial number of outliers may make
the process unworkable for positive-value claims, some strategic behavior in rejecting the presumptions may occur, and risk
preferences and informational limitations may lead to some socially undesirable decisions to contest (or not contest) the pre155
sumptive award. As I have emphasized, these costs are a necessary consequence of protecting the right of individuals to
submit individualized proof on causation and damages. As long
as a class action using presumptive judgments yields more net
social benefit than other class actions or dispute-resolution
156
mechanisms, these costs are worth incurring, and a presumptive-judgment process is worth adopting.
But arguing only that a presumptive-judgment process is
the most efficient mechanism available, all things considered,
undersells its strength. Certainly a part of the argument for
presumptive averaging is its capacity to capture some of the ef154. Cf. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 553 (1991) (“Imposing monetary sanctions on parties that violate . . .
[Rule 11] may confer a benefit on other litigants, but the Rules Enabling Act is
not violated by such incidental effects on substantive rights.”).
155. See supra Parts II.B.1–3.
156. On the foundational nature of this assumption to a system of presumptive judgments, see supra note 71.
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ficiency gains that trial by statistics had promised. Except on
efficiency grounds, however, trial by statistics was a deeply
flawed concept. It provided inaccurate compensation to many of
the unsampled class members, and it gave neither those members nor the defendant an opportunity to participate in the pro157
cess of determining the proper relief due in individual cases.
It pushed the scope of judicial power to alter substantive rights
to (and possibly beyond) the permissible limit, and it arguably
infringed on constitutional norms for due process and jury tri158
al. Presumptive averaging, which provides parties with the
opportunity to obtain accurate individual recoveries at trial,
fares far better on all of these scores.
More generally, procedural arguments tend to fall into one
of three camps: an efficiency camp, a rights-based camp, and a
159
process camp. The efficiency approach seeks to minimize the
sum of litigation and error costs; the rights-based approach
emphasizes the accurate enforcement of individual substantive
rights; and the process camp emphasizes values such as auton160
omy, participation, and dignity. Although disagreeing over
the nature of a proper outcome, the first two theories are both
consequentialist (or outcome-centered); the third is deontological (or process-centered).
Presumptive averaging broadly appeals to all three rationales. Given that trial by statistics is off the table, presumptive
averaging is the least costly way to resolve the dispute—for the
161
simple reason that it is to be used only when it is least costly.
Thus, it satisfies the efficiency model.
Presumptive averaging also does not discourage the enforcement of individual rights. It establishes a presumptive
award, but it permits individuals the freedom to prove that
they are entitled to pay or receive a different recovery. Of
course, the economics of presumptive judgments (especially
given cost shifting to the party who chooses to contest the presumption) may dictate that the parties accept the presumptive
award rather than press on to obtain a more accurate individu-

157. See supra Part I.B.
158. See supra Parts I.B–C.
159. See Bone, supra note 22, at 919; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 191 (2004) (positing three models of adjudication: an accuracy model, a balancing (or efficiency) model, and a participation model).
160. See Bone, supra note 22, at 919.
161. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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al award. But that reality is always present in a world of costly
procedure. The costliness of procedure inhibits a plaintiff with
a valid $500 claim from bringing suit to vindicate the right. The
costliness and uncertainty of procedure likewise induce parties
162
to settle their claims rather than try them to their conclusion.
Under a rights-based theory, the goal of procedure should be to
keep these costs to a minimum, in order to obtain the most enforcement possible, while still providing a forum to determine
the validity of claims for all those willing to endure any remaining costs. Under presumptive judgments, parties who are willing to pay for the privilege are able to obtain an individualized
163
assessment of their claims or defenses. The presumptivejudgment process no more discourages the exercise of that privilege than any process that uses the loser-pays rule.
For the same reasons, presumptive judgments do not directly offend non-instrumental values such as participation,
dignity, autonomy, or equality. Parties retain the right to participate in individual litigation; they are not required to accept
the presumptive award. Of course, the presumptive award,
when combined with cost shifting, creates an inducement not to
litigate, but the same is true of many presumptions that seek to
164
discourage litigation on certain matters. Attempting to influence an autonomous individual’s choice not to use a social resource (such as a court system) unless a social benefit exists is
not a violation of the party’s autonomy when the individual remains free to pay for the privilege of using the resource. Likewise, presumptive judgments start with the proposition of
equal treatment for all class members, but allow the parties the
opportunity to assert relevant differences. Like cases are treated alike, but the parties retain the power to prove that some
cases are unalike.
The only process-based concern arises indirectly—from the
effect of presumptive averaging when its use allows a court to
165
certify a class that otherwise would not have been certified. A
person who believes that class actions invariably violate rights
of participation or autonomy might thus object to any process

162. See Shavell, supra note 76, at 63–69 (describing how risk-neutral parties make settlement valuations based on expected value and the costs of litigation).
163. See supra Part II.A.
164. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 106, at 1, 61.
165. On the way in which the process might have an impact at the classcertification stage, see supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text.
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that “improves” class actions in a way that made them more
166
readily usable. Even here, the argument would need to be
limited to positive-value cases; in negative-value cases class actions do not violate any significant interests in participation or
autonomy for the simple reason that the class members would
167
never have sued individually. Whatever the precise breadth
of the autonomy critique, a presumptive-judgment process
must plead guilty to this particular charge: its effect is indeed
to make class or other mass aggregation a more viable alternative.
On balance, presumptive averaging fares well under the
standard arguments made to justify procedural devices. It is
admittedly a pragmatic solution, not perfect from any perspective. From an efficiency perspective, trial by statistics is better,
but that device in its pure form is dead and unlikely to return.
From a rights-based perspective, presumptive judgments are
not as desirable as individual adjudication. But in the real
world individual adjudication can be enormously costly. The
choice will often be between imperfect presumptive judgments
and no adjudication at all; in light of that reality, presumptive
judgments, with their reservation of the right to pursue individual litigation that the parties are willing to pay for, satisfies
the rights-based approach. For similar reasons, presumptive
averaging does a decent, albeit imperfect, job of respecting the
rights of autonomy, participation, and equality.
As a pragmatic solution, presumptive judgments are subject to the criticism that they fail to be faithful to any single
theory of procedure. In procedure, however, such pragmatic
168
balancing is common, especially because no theory of proce166. For an extended critique of class actions principally on autonomy
grounds, see MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 125–34, 140–
75 (2009). For another critique of class actions due to their limited capacity to
vindicate participatory principles, but ultimately concluding that class actions
with limited participatory rights (or, in some instances with no participatory
rights) can be appropriate, see Solum, supra note 159, at 313–20.
167. See REDISH, supra note 166, at 172 (recognizing that opt-out negativevalue class actions may be permissible when the small claim value renders
“the constitutional interest in litigant autonomy . . . de minimis”). But Professor Redish would not permit negative-value class actions when the amount at
stake is so small that putative class members would not even bother to file a
claim. Id. at 131–32. In his view, these “bounty hunter” suits, which benefit
only the lawyers, are functionally qui tam actions unauthorized by statute. Id.
168. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a balancing test for analyzing issues under the Due Process Clause); cf. FED. R.
CIV. P. 1 (stating that the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “to
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dure has yet won the heart and mind of all. How we do things
(process) should matter, but what we achieve (substance) also
169
should matter. Even when these considerations do not lead to
the choice of a single correct procedural rule, our obligation is
to make “choices . . . on reasoning that we can reflectively sus170
tain if we subject them to critical scrutiny.” Presumptive
judgments are precisely that sort of solution.
CONCLUSION
Using a presumptive-judgment approach would not have
saved the Wal-Mart class action, which suffered from defects
unrelated to the difficulty of calculating class members’ indi171
vidual damages. Nor is the technique appropriate for every
class action seeking damages. While it is no panacea for everything that ails class actions, presumptive judgments can be
useful when the difficulty of calculating individual damages is
the sticking point in class certification and when, in addition,
the parties have little financial incentive to contest the application of the presumptive award to individual claims. In this
modified form, trial by statistics should enjoy a long and fruitful life.

secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding”).
169. Cf. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 20–23, 208–17 (2009) (developing a “comprehensive outcome” theory of justice, in which both methods and
outcomes are relevant considerations).
170. Id. at 180.
171. A majority of the Court found that the class action failed to meet the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541, 2550–57 (2011), and the Court unanimously held that Rule
23(b)(2) could not be used as a vehicle for obtaining damages, id. at 2557–61.

